The oldest temple in the valley is the Changu Narayan Temple, located 22 km from Kathmandu and a 25-minute drive from Bhaktapur city. The original temple was built in the 4th century during the time of the Lichhavi rulers and is perched on a hill overlooking the nearby city. Much of it was rebuilt in the 18th century.
This temple is known for its beauty, location and age. It is a Vishnu temple. One of the oldest Lichhavi period stone inscriptions is also found here. A Vishnu image with ten heads and ten arms is another fine example of stone carving from the 5th century. The struts of the two-tiered temple depict the ten incarnations in which Narayan destroyed evildoers. A 6th century stone statue shows the cosmic form of Vishnu, while another recalls the dwarf incarnation in which he crushed the evil King Bali. Garuda, the steed of Vishnu, kneels before the temple. The statue of Vishnu astride his steed is a popular favorite.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Monday, May 4, 2009
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Emotional Intelligence (EI), often measured as an Emotional Intelligence Quotient (EQ), is a term that describes the ability, capacity, skill or (in the case of the trait EI model) a self-perceived ability, to identify, assess, and manage the emotions of one’s self,of other,and of groups.
Emotional Intelligence tests/activities/exercises books - for young people ostensibly, but just as relevant to grown-ups - provide interesting and useful exercises, examples, theory, etc., for presentations and participative experience if you are explaining EQ or teaching a group.
Emotional intelligence is increasingly relevant to organizational development and developing people. Emotional intelligence is an important consideration in human resources planning; job profiling, recruitment interviewing and selection, management development, customer relation and customer service and more.
Emotional intelligence links strongly with concepts of love and spirituality: bringing compassion and humanity to work, and also to multiple intelligence” theory which illustrates and measure the range of capabilities people possess, and the fact that everybody has value.
Emotional intelligence has two aspects
Understanding yourself, your goals, intentions, responses, behavior and all.
Understanding others, and their feelings.
Recent studies indicate that emotional intelligence influences behavior in a wide range of domains including school, community, and the workplace. At the individual level, it has been said to relate to academic achievement, work performance, our ability to communicate effectively, solve everyday problems, build meaningful interpersonal relationships, and even our ability to make moral decisions. Given that EI has the potential to increase our understanding of how individuals behave and adapt to their social environment, it is an important topic for study.
Emotional intelligence five 'domains' of EQ as:
• Knowing your emotions.
• Managing your own emotions.
• Motivating yourself.
• Recognizing and understanding other people's emotions.
• Managing relationships, i.e., managing the emotions of others.
. By developing our Emotional Intelligence in these areas and the five EQ domains we can become more productive and successful at what we do, and help others to be more productive and successful too. The process and outcomes of Emotional Intelligence development also contain many elements known to reduce stress for individuals and organizations, by decreasing conflict, improving relationships and understanding, and increasing stability, continuity and harmony.
Emotional Competence
Emotional Competence is a learned capability based on emotional intelligence
that results in outstanding performance at work. Our emotional intelligence
determines our potential for learning the practical skills that are based on its five
elements: self-awareness, motivation, self-regulation, empathy, and adeptness in
relationships. Our emotional competence, on the other hand, shows how much of
that potential we have translated into on-the-job capabilities. For instance, being
good at serving customers is an emotional competence based on empathy.
Likewise, trustworthiness is a competence based on self-regulation, or handling
impulses and emotions well. Both customer service and trustworthiness are
competencies that can make people outstanding in their work. Simply being high
in emotional intelligence does not guarantee a person will have learned the
emotional competencies that matter for work; it means only that they have
excellent potential to learn them.
The emotional competence frame work
Personal competence-self awareness, self regulation, self-motivation
1) Self-awareness
(a)emotional awareness: Recognizing one’s emotions and their effects.
(b) Accurate self-assessment: knowing one’s strengths and limits.
(c) Self-confidence: sureness about one’s self-worth and capabilities.
2) Self-regulation
(a) Self-control: managing disruptive emotions and impulses.
(b) Trust worthiness: maintaining standards of honesty and integrity.
(c) conscientiousness-taking responsibility for personal performance.
(d)adaptability-flexibility in handling change.
(e) innovativeness-being comfortable with and open to novel ideas and new information.
(3) Self-motivation
Achievement drive-striving to improve or meet a standard of excellence.
(a)commitment-aligning with the goals of the group organization.
(b) Initiative: readiness to act on opportunities.
(c) optimism-persistence in pursuing goals despite obstacles and setbacks.
Social awareness
empathy- sensing others feelings and perspectives, and taking an active interest concerns
Service orientations: anticipating,recognizing,and meeting customer’s needs.
Developing others:sensing what others need in order to develop,and bolstering their abilities.
Leveraging diversity: cultivating opportunities through diverse people.
Political awareness:reading a group’s emotional currents and power relationships.
Social skills
(a)Influence:wielding effective tactics for persuasion.
(b)Communication:sending clear and conciving messages.
(c ) Leadership:inspiring and guiding groups and people.
(d)Change catalyst: intiating or managing change.
Example of emotional Intelligence
Here’s a cautionary tale about two students, Penn and Matt. Penn was a brilliant
and creative student, an exemplar of the best Yale had to offer. The trouble with
Penn was he knew he was exceptional – and so was, as one professor put it,
“unbelievably arrogant.” Even so, he looked spectacular on paper. When he
graduated, Penn was highly sought after. He got a lot of invitations for job
interviews. But Penn’s arrogance came across all too clearly; he ended up with
only one job offer from a second-tier outfit. Matt, on the other hand, wasn’t as
academically brilliant. But he was adept interpersonally. Everyone who worked
with him liked him. Matt ended up with seven job offers out of eight interviews
and went on to success in his field, while Penn was let go after two years at his
first job. Penn lacked – and Matt had – emotional intelligence.
.
References
• Goleman, D. (1998). Working with emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books
• Bradberry, Travis and Greaves, Jean. (2005). The Emotional Intelligence Quick Book. New York:
• Bar-On, R. (1997). The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): a test of emotional intelligence.
• Kluemper, D. H. (2008) Trait emotional intelligence
• Petrides, K. V., Pita, R., Kokkinaki, F. (2007). The location of trait emotional intelligence.
• Petrides, K. V. & Furnham, A. (2000a). On the dimensional structure of emotional intelligence. Personality
Emotional Intelligence tests/activities/exercises books - for young people ostensibly, but just as relevant to grown-ups - provide interesting and useful exercises, examples, theory, etc., for presentations and participative experience if you are explaining EQ or teaching a group.
Emotional intelligence is increasingly relevant to organizational development and developing people. Emotional intelligence is an important consideration in human resources planning; job profiling, recruitment interviewing and selection, management development, customer relation and customer service and more.
Emotional intelligence links strongly with concepts of love and spirituality: bringing compassion and humanity to work, and also to multiple intelligence” theory which illustrates and measure the range of capabilities people possess, and the fact that everybody has value.
Emotional intelligence has two aspects
Understanding yourself, your goals, intentions, responses, behavior and all.
Understanding others, and their feelings.
Recent studies indicate that emotional intelligence influences behavior in a wide range of domains including school, community, and the workplace. At the individual level, it has been said to relate to academic achievement, work performance, our ability to communicate effectively, solve everyday problems, build meaningful interpersonal relationships, and even our ability to make moral decisions. Given that EI has the potential to increase our understanding of how individuals behave and adapt to their social environment, it is an important topic for study.
Emotional intelligence five 'domains' of EQ as:
• Knowing your emotions.
• Managing your own emotions.
• Motivating yourself.
• Recognizing and understanding other people's emotions.
• Managing relationships, i.e., managing the emotions of others.
. By developing our Emotional Intelligence in these areas and the five EQ domains we can become more productive and successful at what we do, and help others to be more productive and successful too. The process and outcomes of Emotional Intelligence development also contain many elements known to reduce stress for individuals and organizations, by decreasing conflict, improving relationships and understanding, and increasing stability, continuity and harmony.
Emotional Competence
Emotional Competence is a learned capability based on emotional intelligence
that results in outstanding performance at work. Our emotional intelligence
determines our potential for learning the practical skills that are based on its five
elements: self-awareness, motivation, self-regulation, empathy, and adeptness in
relationships. Our emotional competence, on the other hand, shows how much of
that potential we have translated into on-the-job capabilities. For instance, being
good at serving customers is an emotional competence based on empathy.
Likewise, trustworthiness is a competence based on self-regulation, or handling
impulses and emotions well. Both customer service and trustworthiness are
competencies that can make people outstanding in their work. Simply being high
in emotional intelligence does not guarantee a person will have learned the
emotional competencies that matter for work; it means only that they have
excellent potential to learn them.
The emotional competence frame work
Personal competence-self awareness, self regulation, self-motivation
1) Self-awareness
(a)emotional awareness: Recognizing one’s emotions and their effects.
(b) Accurate self-assessment: knowing one’s strengths and limits.
(c) Self-confidence: sureness about one’s self-worth and capabilities.
2) Self-regulation
(a) Self-control: managing disruptive emotions and impulses.
(b) Trust worthiness: maintaining standards of honesty and integrity.
(c) conscientiousness-taking responsibility for personal performance.
(d)adaptability-flexibility in handling change.
(e) innovativeness-being comfortable with and open to novel ideas and new information.
(3) Self-motivation
Achievement drive-striving to improve or meet a standard of excellence.
(a)commitment-aligning with the goals of the group organization.
(b) Initiative: readiness to act on opportunities.
(c) optimism-persistence in pursuing goals despite obstacles and setbacks.
Social awareness
empathy- sensing others feelings and perspectives, and taking an active interest concerns
Service orientations: anticipating,recognizing,and meeting customer’s needs.
Developing others:sensing what others need in order to develop,and bolstering their abilities.
Leveraging diversity: cultivating opportunities through diverse people.
Political awareness:reading a group’s emotional currents and power relationships.
Social skills
(a)Influence:wielding effective tactics for persuasion.
(b)Communication:sending clear and conciving messages.
(c ) Leadership:inspiring and guiding groups and people.
(d)Change catalyst: intiating or managing change.
Example of emotional Intelligence
Here’s a cautionary tale about two students, Penn and Matt. Penn was a brilliant
and creative student, an exemplar of the best Yale had to offer. The trouble with
Penn was he knew he was exceptional – and so was, as one professor put it,
“unbelievably arrogant.” Even so, he looked spectacular on paper. When he
graduated, Penn was highly sought after. He got a lot of invitations for job
interviews. But Penn’s arrogance came across all too clearly; he ended up with
only one job offer from a second-tier outfit. Matt, on the other hand, wasn’t as
academically brilliant. But he was adept interpersonally. Everyone who worked
with him liked him. Matt ended up with seven job offers out of eight interviews
and went on to success in his field, while Penn was let go after two years at his
first job. Penn lacked – and Matt had – emotional intelligence.
.
References
• Goleman, D. (1998). Working with emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books
• Bradberry, Travis and Greaves, Jean. (2005). The Emotional Intelligence Quick Book. New York:
• Bar-On, R. (1997). The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): a test of emotional intelligence.
• Kluemper, D. H. (2008) Trait emotional intelligence
• Petrides, K. V., Pita, R., Kokkinaki, F. (2007). The location of trait emotional intelligence.
• Petrides, K. V. & Furnham, A. (2000a). On the dimensional structure of emotional intelligence. Personality
Friday, May 1, 2009
Conspiracy journalism
Conspiracy journalism represents a genre of journalism that has elements of advocacy journalism and investigation journalism. It typically intends to exposure or reveals a plan plot or conspiracy towards a group of innocents’ .Conspiracy journalism usually exists in the lesser known sections of media and may have significant political or religious overtones.
Conspiracy journalism has grown significantly since the proliferation of the internet. Previously, it existed in published traits. Conspiracy journalism uses the elements of propaganda to faster interest and gain readers.
Examples of conspiracy journalism
Most recently, the growth of the 9/11 truth movement has been fueled by its own conspiracy journalism. This is the publication and reporting of issues, information, opionion and data related to their specific cause. Thousands of pages of documents, stories and articles have been generated by this organization in it’s quest to validate it’s stated position. During the controversy in 2000 presidential election, main steam media organization the Florida recount. It was only later that a comprehensive review by the New York Times revealed no conspiracy existed.
Conspiracy journalism has grown significantly since the proliferation of the internet. Previously, it existed in published traits. Conspiracy journalism uses the elements of propaganda to faster interest and gain readers.
Examples of conspiracy journalism
Most recently, the growth of the 9/11 truth movement has been fueled by its own conspiracy journalism. This is the publication and reporting of issues, information, opionion and data related to their specific cause. Thousands of pages of documents, stories and articles have been generated by this organization in it’s quest to validate it’s stated position. During the controversy in 2000 presidential election, main steam media organization the Florida recount. It was only later that a comprehensive review by the New York Times revealed no conspiracy existed.
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
Why are journalism and democracy considered inter-dependent? Disscuss with suitable examples.
Journalist act as the bridge between authority and people. Press need to deal with the government for two reasons
(1) due to it’s watchdog function
(2) bridging function
Journalist play the vital role of “watchdog” over the government looking out for instances of malfunction and corruption. The public would have far less control over the affairs of the government without the probing questions of investigative reporters. Democracy of journalism means freedom of press which gives right to publish without prior restraint and freedom from despotic control by the government.
It provides an independent channel of communication between groups in society.
It also provides a forum of public debate about the issues of the day, it articulates public opinion arising from this debate and it forces governments to take account of what people think. Journalism is thus the agency through which private citizens are reconstituted as a public body exercising informal supervision of the state.
Democracy and journalism are deeply inter-dependent because it assume that human beings are rational and are capable of making their own decisions and the government exists to serve the individual. We also know the meaning of freedom of the journalism which assumes that journalism will not overlook the poor and powerless. Actually journalism is the voice of voiceless people.
The principle and purpose of journalism are defined by something more basic the function news plays in the lives of the people. For all that the face of journalism may change but its purpose remain remarkably constant, since the notion of the journalism first evolved . the central purpose of journalism is to tell the truth so that people will have the information that they need to sovereign.
Democracy means people power and Journalism is to bring messages from the government to the people and vice versa for transparency (trust) and accuracy in order for the people to have clear images of whom they want to be their leaders.
Democracy is the system of government where people control the government through election and it is well known fact that only a well-informed citizen can take better decisions. Journalism is that sole medium through which people become informed about the governmental activities because journalism plays the active role of watchdog. Media is the main source of information for public. So when public are given diversified in formations, they take their own decisions. In a way, we can say, media is not the power house itself but it enjoys the power through the public support. So media indirectly control the government.
A lot of countries now have a trend toward democracy and this is the journalism's essensial duty really to help those people who are in need when they need somebody to explain them that they have their own rights to choose the government who can ensure their needs.
On the other side, journalism by definition always sticks to the key word “news”. Also journalism is more tilted towards social service and less towards business, so authentic and fact news distributed before wide audience by journalism are certain to serve and make people aware of governmental activities, changing trend in the society and also the ups and down of the whole world.
There are countries where the vast majority of people don't have access to basic life necessities such as food, running water, electricity, medical care, etc. It's very unlikely that those people would know much about democracy let alone fight for it. Roman republic contributed into different aspects of democracy such as Laws, it never became a democracy. The Romans had elections for choosing representatives, but again women, slaves, and the large foreign population were excluded. So the public opinion is formed by media through the public feedbacks and responses which is a must for democracy. Even in our own country Nepal, the exclusion of Janajatis, Madhesis and other marginalized groups of Nepali inhabitants from the main-stream media and also the main-stream politics became the greatest reason for Maoist decade long civil war and also the biggest threat for democratic government leaded by Nepali Congress Party. So democracy and media are two sides of the same coin and incomplete without one another’s being.
For example the ‘independent’ press and the fight for democracy in Zimbabwe: A critical analysis of the banned Daily News
The closure of The Daily News, Zimbabwe’s only ‘independent’ newspaper in 2003 attracted both local and worldwide condemnation as the height of the Zimbabwe government’s intolerance of diverse viewpoints. This paper critically analyses the circumstances surrounding the closure of The Daily News and argues that to a great degree, and in various ways, the paper contributed to its own closure, not least because of the hidden motives and ineptitude of its management. Despite immense contribution to opening up the democratic space in Zimbabwe, The Daily News had, right from the beginning, inherent problems that conspired with the political environment leading to its closure in 2003. The paper also argues that foreign ownership and foreign funding of media in developing countries can lead to the erosion of the necessary legitimacy that these media need to compete on the local market. It argues that while the independent press has undoubtedly played a crucial role in the democratization process, they have failed to temper their new found freedom with responsibility. It has become widely accepted that the media are central to modern democracy as primary sources of information. This is because democracy as a political system requires an informed citizenry that is capable of participating effectively in public debate and in the overall political process where they have to make informed decisions.
(1) due to it’s watchdog function
(2) bridging function
Journalist play the vital role of “watchdog” over the government looking out for instances of malfunction and corruption. The public would have far less control over the affairs of the government without the probing questions of investigative reporters. Democracy of journalism means freedom of press which gives right to publish without prior restraint and freedom from despotic control by the government.
It provides an independent channel of communication between groups in society.
It also provides a forum of public debate about the issues of the day, it articulates public opinion arising from this debate and it forces governments to take account of what people think. Journalism is thus the agency through which private citizens are reconstituted as a public body exercising informal supervision of the state.
Democracy and journalism are deeply inter-dependent because it assume that human beings are rational and are capable of making their own decisions and the government exists to serve the individual. We also know the meaning of freedom of the journalism which assumes that journalism will not overlook the poor and powerless. Actually journalism is the voice of voiceless people.
The principle and purpose of journalism are defined by something more basic the function news plays in the lives of the people. For all that the face of journalism may change but its purpose remain remarkably constant, since the notion of the journalism first evolved . the central purpose of journalism is to tell the truth so that people will have the information that they need to sovereign.
Democracy means people power and Journalism is to bring messages from the government to the people and vice versa for transparency (trust) and accuracy in order for the people to have clear images of whom they want to be their leaders.
Democracy is the system of government where people control the government through election and it is well known fact that only a well-informed citizen can take better decisions. Journalism is that sole medium through which people become informed about the governmental activities because journalism plays the active role of watchdog. Media is the main source of information for public. So when public are given diversified in formations, they take their own decisions. In a way, we can say, media is not the power house itself but it enjoys the power through the public support. So media indirectly control the government.
A lot of countries now have a trend toward democracy and this is the journalism's essensial duty really to help those people who are in need when they need somebody to explain them that they have their own rights to choose the government who can ensure their needs.
On the other side, journalism by definition always sticks to the key word “news”. Also journalism is more tilted towards social service and less towards business, so authentic and fact news distributed before wide audience by journalism are certain to serve and make people aware of governmental activities, changing trend in the society and also the ups and down of the whole world.
There are countries where the vast majority of people don't have access to basic life necessities such as food, running water, electricity, medical care, etc. It's very unlikely that those people would know much about democracy let alone fight for it. Roman republic contributed into different aspects of democracy such as Laws, it never became a democracy. The Romans had elections for choosing representatives, but again women, slaves, and the large foreign population were excluded. So the public opinion is formed by media through the public feedbacks and responses which is a must for democracy. Even in our own country Nepal, the exclusion of Janajatis, Madhesis and other marginalized groups of Nepali inhabitants from the main-stream media and also the main-stream politics became the greatest reason for Maoist decade long civil war and also the biggest threat for democratic government leaded by Nepali Congress Party. So democracy and media are two sides of the same coin and incomplete without one another’s being.
For example the ‘independent’ press and the fight for democracy in Zimbabwe: A critical analysis of the banned Daily News
The closure of The Daily News, Zimbabwe’s only ‘independent’ newspaper in 2003 attracted both local and worldwide condemnation as the height of the Zimbabwe government’s intolerance of diverse viewpoints. This paper critically analyses the circumstances surrounding the closure of The Daily News and argues that to a great degree, and in various ways, the paper contributed to its own closure, not least because of the hidden motives and ineptitude of its management. Despite immense contribution to opening up the democratic space in Zimbabwe, The Daily News had, right from the beginning, inherent problems that conspired with the political environment leading to its closure in 2003. The paper also argues that foreign ownership and foreign funding of media in developing countries can lead to the erosion of the necessary legitimacy that these media need to compete on the local market. It argues that while the independent press has undoubtedly played a crucial role in the democratization process, they have failed to temper their new found freedom with responsibility. It has become widely accepted that the media are central to modern democracy as primary sources of information. This is because democracy as a political system requires an informed citizenry that is capable of participating effectively in public debate and in the overall political process where they have to make informed decisions.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
MIMAMSA
DEFINATION ON MIMAMSA
It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in the Brâhmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smrti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâmsâ (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mîmâmsâ sûtras_ (which are with us the foundations of Mîmâmsâ) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him.
Mîmâmsâ as philosophy and Mîmâmsâ as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mîmâmsâ agrees in the main with Vais'esika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti, samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumârila was influenced by Sâmkhya thought rather than by Nyâya. Sâmkhya and Vais'esika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vais'esika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'esika about the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mîmâmsâ with Nyâya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions invalid. The other pramânas such as perception, inference, etc. were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other pramânas, but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâna of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the Mîmâmsâ as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhmanas (also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are three classes of injunctions
(1) apûrva-vidhi,
(2) niyama-vidhi, and
(3) parisankhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi
Is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi. In parisankhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take up the rein" (_imâm agrbhnâm ras'anâm_) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an ass.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually
Taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called the _arthavâdas_) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force called _apûrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven).
The Mîmâmsâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (_smrti_) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge
There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's. Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.
Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyâjñâna_ or _phalajñâna_) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge (_svatah-prâmânya_), but validity is ascertained by _samvâda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote ref l].
It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity (_svatah-prâmâya_) of knowledge in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well (_svakâryakarane svatah prâmânyam jñânasya_). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work (_pravrtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mîmâmsa means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data (_jñânasya prâmânyam svatah aprâmânyam paratah_). Knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (_bâdhakajñâna_) comes in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective (_karanadosajñâna). It is from these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself
It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in the Brâhmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smrti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâmsâ (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mîmâmsâ sûtras_ (which are with us the foundations of Mîmâmsâ) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him.
Mîmâmsâ as philosophy and Mîmâmsâ as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mîmâmsâ agrees in the main with Vais'esika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti, samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumârila was influenced by Sâmkhya thought rather than by Nyâya. Sâmkhya and Vais'esika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vais'esika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'esika about the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mîmâmsâ with Nyâya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions invalid. The other pramânas such as perception, inference, etc. were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other pramânas, but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâna of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the Mîmâmsâ as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhmanas (also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are three classes of injunctions
(1) apûrva-vidhi,
(2) niyama-vidhi, and
(3) parisankhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi
Is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi. In parisankhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take up the rein" (_imâm agrbhnâm ras'anâm_) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an ass.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually
Taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called the _arthavâdas_) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force called _apûrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven).
The Mîmâmsâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (_smrti_) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge
There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's. Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.
Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyâjñâna_ or _phalajñâna_) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge (_svatah-prâmânya_), but validity is ascertained by _samvâda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote ref l].
It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity (_svatah-prâmâya_) of knowledge in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well (_svakâryakarane svatah prâmânyam jñânasya_). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work (_pravrtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mîmâmsa means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data (_jñânasya prâmânyam svatah aprâmânyam paratah_). Knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (_bâdhakajñâna_) comes in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective (_karanadosajñâna). It is from these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself
KITE RUNNER
Kite runner by Khaled Hosseini, is a story of betrayal, love, and redemption set in modern
The Kite runner spans over three decades of great upheaval in
Although The Kite Runner is set in this true background of social upheaval, the magic of the novel is in its characters and storytelling. There is great psychological insight and complexity and the arc of the story returns us to its beginning, where Amir must face his past and make amends.
Apparently The Kite Runner is Khaled Hosseini's first novel, and the first Afghan novel written originally in English. It is an extraordinary accomplishment.
One thing that continued to strike me throughout the story was how I personally wanted to shake some sense into Amir to do the right thing. He is so humanly flawed, when we want him to step up to heroism. That he would even consider leaving Hassan's son in the care of American aid workers, rather than taking full responsibility for him, is beyond me. But as I mentioned, the book is about redemption, and ultimately Amir recovers his soul and does the right thing. What remains to be seen is whether the boy can recover.
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